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I. INTRODUCTION
When the global computer network known today as the Internet was
formed, idealists envisioned it as a tool for efficient exchange of information.!
Shea on Behalf of American Reporter v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 925-26 (S.D.N.Y.
1996). The joint stipulations in this case provide an excellent, fairly brief overview of the
Internet's history.
What we now refer to as the Internet grew out of an experimental project of
the Department of Defense's Advanced Research Projects Administration
("ARPA") designed to provide researchers with direct access to supercomput-
ers at a few key laboratories and to facilitate the reliable transmission of vital
corrmunications.... ARPA supplied funds to link computers operated by
the military, defense contractors, and universities conducting defense related
research through dedicated phone lines, creating a "network" known as
ARPANet.... Having successfully implemented a system for the reliable
transfer of information over a computer network, ARPA began to support the
development of communications protocols for transferring data between
different types of computer networks. Universities, research facilities, and
commercial entities began to develop and link together their own networks
implementing these protocols; these networks included a high-speed
"backbone" network known as NSFNet, sponsored by the National Science
Foundation, smaller regional networks, and, eventually, large commercial
networks run by organizations such as Sprint, IBM, and Performance Systems
International (commonly known as "PSI").... As faster networks devel-
oped, most network traffic shifted away from ARPANet, which formally
ceased operations in 1990.... What we know as "the Internet" today is the
series of linked, overlapping networks that gradually supplanted ARPANet.
Because the Internet links together independent networks that merely use the
same data transfer protocols, it cannot be said that any single entity or group
of entities controls, or can control, the content made publicly available on the
Internet or limits, or can limit, the ability of others to access public content.
Rather, the resources available to one with Interet access are located on
individual computers around the world.... It is estimated that as many as
forty million individuals have access to the information and tools of the
Intemet, and that figure is expected to grow to 200 million by the year 1999.
... Access to the Internet can take any one of several forms. First, many
educational institutions, businesses, libraries, and individual communities
maintain a computer network linked directly to the Internet and issue account
numbers and passwords enabling users to gain access to the network directly
orbyrmodem. ... Second, 'Internet service providers,' generally commercial
entities charging a monthly fee, offer modem access to computers or networks
linked directly to the Internet.... Third, national commercial 'on-line
services' ... allow subscribers to gain access to the Internet while providing
extensive content within their own proprietary networks.... Finally,
organizations and businesses can offer access to electronic bulletin-board
systems-which, like national on-line services, provide certain proprietary
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While the Internet does serve that idealistic purpose today, businesses have
realized its potential for sales and marketing purposes also. It is impossible to
live in today's society and not be bombarded by messages from corporate
entities touting their products and directing the consumer to the company's
website. Even the United States Postal Service has marketed itself as the
choice of "e-tailers," in the hopes that the obsession of society with everything
Internet-related will boost its products' appeal by association.
Certainly, the influx of huge amounts of capital that has resulted from
business's interest in the Internet has driven quantum leaps in the technology
of both hardware and software and provided a seemingly infinite supply of
jobs. However, legislation has been much slower to make similar advances.
Furthermore, in common law countries such as the United States, precedent
has been strained to deal with the new issues posed by the pervasive nature of
the Internet today. Legal practitioners and businesses are left uncertain as to
how various issues will be interpreted by their opposite numbers, not to
mention the court system. A myriad of potential legal problems are associated
with the Internet, beginning with the very basic idea of personal jurisdiction,
and 'growing to include property issues involving e-mail on company-owned
systems, digital signature verification, exportation of encryption technologies,
and, most importantly for the purpose of this note, issues of contract formation
and enforcement. These issues are difficult enough to resolve on a national
level, but when issues of international jurisdiction and choice of law doctrines
arise, the problems become massive in scope. This note examines first
domestic solutions to these problems and then how international agreements
can mirror and/or complicate them. Finally, it suggests how the international
community can effectively harmonize the law and custom extant today and in
which direction novel law should point for a more effective regulation regime
in the future.
II. UNITED STATES CASE LAW
A. First Amendment Nature of Internet "Speech "
One of the most high-profile issues in U.S. Internet regulation is pornogra-
phy. This issue was brought into the public light with the Computer Decency
Act of 1996 (hereinafter CDA).2 A constitutional challenge of the CDA
content; some bulletin-board systems in turn offer users links to the Internet.
Id.
2 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 223-230 (West. Supp. 1998).
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resulted in an injunction against enforcement of certain provisions and
provided a forum for discussion of perspectives on the Internet.'
On appeal, the Supreme Court conceived of the Internet first and foremost
as a communications medium, similar (though different in certain significant
ways) to radio or television. Justice Stevens, writing on behalf of Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsberg, and Breyer (Justice O'Connor
wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist joined), noted the dual conception of the World Wide Web
in the eyes of various parties. To Stevens, the "reader" likens the Web to
"both a vast library including millions of readily available and indexed
publications and a sprawling mall offering goods and services." The
"publisher" sees the Web as a "vast platform from which to address and hear
from a world-wide audience of millions of readers, viewers, researchers, and
buyers. '
Justice Stevens's opinion included observations of the three-judge District
Court panel-opinions that also seemed to view the Internet as a mode of
communication. Judge Buckwalter concluded that the "unique nature" of
Internet communication aggravated the Government's argument that the
vagueness of the CDA's "patently offensive" requirement should be consid-
ered "in context." Judge Dalzell, considering the findings of the court and the
nature of the Internet, went a step further and concluded that Internet
communication was entitled to the" 'highest protection from governmental
intrusion.' "' He pointed out four qualities of communications offered by the
Internet, which he described as "the most participatory form of mass speech
yet developed."' Examining the extensive findings of fact before the court,
Dalzell described the characteristics of the Internet that made Internet speech
unique:
First, the Internet presents very low barriers to entry. Second,
these barriers to entry are identical for both speakers and
listeners. Third, as a result of these low barriers, astoundingly
diverse content is available on the Internet. Fourth, the
Internet provides significant access to all who wish to speak
3 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Penn. 1996), aff'd 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
4 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997).
Id.
See id. at 863 (quoting 929 F. Supp. at 865 n.9).
7Id. (quoting 929 F. Supp. at 883).8 929 F. Supp. at 883.
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in the medium, and even creates a relative parity among the
speakers.9
This "unique nature" argument seemed to appeal to Justice Stevens, as this
concept is an undercurrent throughout his opinion.'0 Stevens also distin-
guished the Internet from broadcast media based on the unique characteristics
recognized by Judge Dalzell and his District Court counterparts. The Court
recognized that some of its prior decisions were predicated on special
justifications for regulation of broadcast media and were inapplicable to other
speakers." Stevens cited precedent in which the Court acknowledged that
"each medium of expression . . . may present its own problems,"12 and
recognized this statement as the basis for having a "special justification" for
many of the cases in which the Court granted limited First Amendment
protection to the broadcast media. 3 Stevens distinguished the cases that might
arise under the CDA from those dealing with broadcast media by noting the
inapplicability ofthe "specialjustification" factors relied upon in other cases;'4
the "vast democratic fora of the Internet" were not historically (and have not
subsequently been) subject to the vast regulation broadcast media have been
and the Internet is not "invasive" in the same manner as radio or television.'
Furthermore, Stevens noted an especially salient point, which, unfortu-
nately for the purposes of this note, he judged unnecessary to discuss in the
context of this case. One of the appellees' briefs argued that because so much
of the Internet's content has an overseas origin, the CDA can not be
"effective" and therefore fails a strict scrutiny test.' 6
9 Id. at 877.
'0 See, e.g., 521 U.S. at 867. Stevens distinguished FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S.
726 (1978), by stating that the FCC had "decades" of experience in regulating radio
communication, whereas the CDA provided no opportunity for evaluation by an agency
"familiar with the unique characteristics of the Internet." Id. Stevens also pointed out that the
FCC's order in Pacifica applied to a medium which historically had received limited protection
under the First Amendment Id.
" See id. at 868.
1 Id. (quoting Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975)).
" Id. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (relying on the
historic extensive government regulation of the medium); Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (relying on scarcity of broadcast frequencies available at the
inception of the medium); Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115
(1989) (relying on the "invasive" nature of the medium).
14 See supra note 13.
IS See 521 U.S. at 868-69 (citing Red Lion, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), and Sable Communica-
tions, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) respectively).
16 See id. at 878 n.45. Appellees' Brief cited Church ofLukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
2001]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
The government's attitude toward the Internet, manifested by Congress'
apparently cursory manner in enacting the CDA,17 shows that, at least on some
level, the government fundamentally misunderstands the nature of the Internet.
If Congress truly wishes to effectively regulate the Internet, a full understand-
ing of the nature of the beast is necessary. Technology that changes daily is
not susceptible to ill-considered regulation.
B. The Internet as a Commercial Vehicle
The preceding analysis is predicated on the idea of Internet communica-
tions as speech. American jurisprudence has followed another course entirely
in dealing with Internet issues; however the Commerce Clause18 rears its head
almost unavoidably when considering the interstate commercial nature of the
Internet is considered; the dormant aspect of the Clause is particularly relevant
in light of the federal government's uncertainty in regulation of the Internet.
This analysis underlies the court's invalidation of New York's Internet
Decency Law 9 inAmerican LibraryAss 'n v. Pataki.20 Judge Preska found that
Hialeah, 502 U.S. 520 (1993), which deals with the First Amendment rights of religious
practice, in support of the argument.
" While all six other titles of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 were discussed
extensively in committee in both houses of Congress, the provisions of the CDA were, in large
part, added in executive committee after committee hearings were concluded or offered as
amendments on the floor during debate. See 521 U.S. at 858 (citing 141 CoNG. REc. S8120
(June 9, 1995) (Exon Amendment No. 1268)). Also, there was questionable need to enact the
CDA in the first place, as United States law already crininalized the transmission of certain
types of material sought to be controlled by the CDA. See id. at 877 n.44 (citing 141 CONG.
REC. S8342 (June 14, 1995) (letter from Kent Markus, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to
Sen. Leahy); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1464-65 (1994) (criminalizing transmission of obscenity); 18 U.S.C.
§ 2251 (1994) (criminalizing transmission of child pornography). It should be noted further that
under the current "community standards" test of obscenity, the standards of the community most
likely to be offended would be used in considering Internet material. See 521 U.S. at 878.
$ U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
'9 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21(3) (McKinney 1997). It states:
A person is guilty of disseminating indecent material to minors in the second
degree when: ... (3) Knowing the character and content of the communica-
tion which, in whole or in part, depicts actual or simulated nudity, sexual
conduct or sado-masochistic abuse, and which is harmful to minors, he
intentionally uses any computer communication system allowing the input,
output, examination or transfer, ofcomputer data or computer programs from
one computer to another, to initiate or engage in such communication with a
person who is a minor.
Id.
20 See American Library Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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the New York law violated the precepts of the Commerce Clause for three
reasons:
First, the Act represents an unconstitutional projection ofNew
York law into conduct that occurs wholly outside of New
York. Second, the Act is invalid because although protecting
children from indecent material is a legitimate and indisput-
ably worthy subject of state legislation, the burdens on
interstate commerce resulting from the Act clearly exceed any
local benefit derived from it. Finally, the Internet is one of
those areas of commerce that must be marked off as a
national preserve to protect users from inconsistent legislation
that, taken to its most extreme, could paralyze development
of the Internet altogether."
For these reasons, Judge Preska decided that, even though there was no.
explicit legislation from Congress that spoke to this issue, the wide-ranging
repercussions of Internet regulation reserve to Congress the exclusive right to
legislate in this area.'
From the beginning of her opinion, Judge Preska eschewed analogies that
sought to place the Internet in traditional media categories, such as radio or
television, and likened it more to a railroad or highway.' This comparison
takes on great importance for her dormant Commerce Clause analysis in
general, but nowhere does it play a greater role than in her discussion of the
infrastructure of Internet communication. It is impossible to categorize any
Internet communication as interstate or intrastate based solely upon its state
of origin. The manner in which information is physically transferred makes
any discussion of interstate or intrastate communication meaningless. Two
practices contribute to this fact. First, an actual transmission over the Internet
can be broken up into units, referred to as "packets," which are transferred
independently from the originating computer to the receiving computer, which
then reassembles the packets into the proper order. These packets do not
necessarily take the same route across the Internet, and, in fact, may travel
through any number of states.24 Also, a common practice is the holding of
copies of material or portions thereof on separate machines to keep the
21 Id. at 169.
n Id.
23 See id. at 161.
24 See id. at 171. This practice is known as "packet switching."
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requests for the original material from the original server to a minimum.
Given this organization, it is practically impossible for a user to know the
origin of the material accessed; so, even if the location of the original server
is known, there is no guarantee the material being accessed is actually issuing
from that server.25
Judge Preska relied on these practices to point out that it is impossible for
the owner of a server to avoid routing communications through New York
State or for a user to ensure that his or her communications stay within the
boundaries of New York. In other words, it would be impossible for server
administrators or users to avoid New York's jurisdictional reach.26 Thus, the
act is "necessarily concerned with interstate communications."27 Even with
that issue settled, Judge Preska still found that a determination had to be made
as to whether or not this communication constituted "commerce" so as to be
under the purview of the Commerce Clause.
The court began its analysis by noting that various kinds of activity,
perhaps not intuitively considered "commercial," nevertheless have been
brought into the realm of the Commerce Clause by the Supreme Court.2 Also,
a potential problem with the New York act in this case is that the parties
jointly stipulated that "[t]he Internet is not exclusively, or even primarily, a
means of commercial communication. '" 9 The court quickly disposed of this
issue by noting express holdings of the Supreme Court that the non-profit
nature of activities do not take those activities outside of the ambit of the
Commerce Clause.3° Judge Preska also noted that the commercial nature of
u See id. This practice is known as "caching."
26 See 969 F. Supp. at 171.
27 Id. at 172 (citing Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383,397 (1988)
which held that only statutes "readily susceptible" to a narrow construction will be so narrowed
to save their being struck down as unconstitutional).
2S See id. Preska cited Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town ofHarrison, 520 U.S. 564
(1997), for the proposition that the dormant Commerce Clause applies to a discriminatory real
estate tax deduction over objections that camp attendees are not commercial items and that the
camp's "product" is "consumed" only within Maine. Further, though, there is another useful
statement from the Court in this case: Stevens stated that "the economic incidence of the tax falls
at least in part on the campers.... [T]he Maine statute, therefore functionally serves as an
export tariff that targets out-of-state consumers by taxing the businesses that principally serve
them." 520 U.S. at 580-81 (citations omitted). Preska also cited Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), as a unique case in Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
holding that race discrimination in a hotel burdened interstate commerce by impeding travel.
2' 969 F. Supp. at 171.
3* See id. at 172-73 (citing Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 573; Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 n.2 (1979); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 621-23
(1978); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 172 n.l (1941); Caminetti v. United States, 242
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the Internet grows almost daily,31 an observation which even the most casual
observer of the Internet, or any medium, for that matter, cannot help but share.
Regardless of commercial activity on the Internet, many users contribute to
interstate commerce simply by purchasing Internet access from an intemet
service provider, patronizing an "Internet caf6," or paying an access fee for a
dial-up BBS.3 2
Further, the court reflected upon the fact that the Internet itself is a
modality of interstate commerce, akin to a highway or a railroad: "The Internet
is more than a means of communication; it also serves as a conduit for
transporting digitized goods.., which can be downloaded from the provider's
site to the Internet user's computer."" All of this leads to the conclusion that
transactions occurring over the Internet are clearly commercial, at least as
much as travel over a "real" superhighway is so.
The court's subsequent Commerce Clause analysis is tripartite. First,
Preska found that the New York law projected its effects beyond state borders;
second, Preska used the balancing test from Pike v. Bruce Church' to find that
the burdens placed on interstate commerce outweigh the local benefits the act
U.S. 470,491 (1917); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 320 (1913)).
31 See 969 F. Supp. at 173.
32 See id. (citing Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1964), stating that a
purchaser of goods from interstate sources which are used in the provision of its services is
participating in interstate commerce, even in connection with the provision of services within
one state).
" Id. Preska cited Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981), as an
example of the invalidation of a state regulation of interstate highways and Southern Pacific Co.
v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) as an example of the invalidation of a state railroad regulation.
This aspect of the Internet is one of the main reasons Preska's analysis is so persuasive; many
critics of her decision fail to recognize the "transport" function of the Internet. See, e.g, James
E. Gaylord, Note, State Regulatory Jurisdiction and the Internet: Letting the Dormant
Commerce Clause Lie, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1095 (1999). Gaylord claims that Judge Preska's
decision is more analogous to early telegraph decisions, rather than transportation decisions like
Kassel and Southern Pacific, and, like in the case of the telegraph, the Court will eventually
allow states more latitude in regulation. Id. at 1117-22. However, this analysis completely fails
to appreciate the fact that actual goods can be transported over the Internet; it is possible to
purchase software or music, for example, over the Internet (goods traditionally available in some
sort of physical medium) and have those goods delivered almost instantaneously to one's
computer, without any intervening medium. Therefore, a comparison to the telegraph is
inartful-a telegraph may be capable of transmitting crude "data" concerning, say, the terms of
a contract, but the Internet is capable of transmitting the data necessary for the formation of the
contract and the subject of the contract itself. In this respect, the Internet is much more akin to
a highway than a telegraph. For all his claims of appreciating the technical constructs of the
Internet, Gaylord falls into the trap of failing to understand the actual functioning of it.
397 U.S. 137 (1970).
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confers; and third, Preska found that the New York law regulated an area that
demands uniform national regulation.
Using a series of tests developed in recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence
to examine the nature of the Internet and the actual effect of the New York law
in this case, the court found that it would be "impossible to restrict the effects
of the New York Act to conduct occurring within New York."35 Given this
fact, Judge Preska found that, regardless of a user's intent, her communication
may be accessible to any citizen of any state-a result that would render the
user liable for prosecution in New York, even if her communication might be
legal in her home state.36 This result also means that New York was suborning
the user's home state's policies to those of New York, an impermissible
imposition of New York law onto Internet users (and citizens) of other states,
which led to the court's finding that the New York law was "per se violative
of the Commerce Clause."37
The court also turned to a more traditional dormant Commerce Clause
analysis using Pike: balancing the local benefits of a statute against the
burdens of the statute on interstate commerce.3" The first prong of this test the
court found rather easily met; "the protection of children against pedophilia is
a quintessentially legitimate state objective... ."" Nevertheless, no matter
how compelling the state's interest may be, the dormant Commerce Clause
inquiry does not end only by a state's showing of a legitimate state interest.'0
As insistent as the state's interest is in the area of Internet decency, the
benefits garnered by this act may be minimal. First, since a significant amount
of communications covered by this act originate from foreign nations, the
31 969 F. Supp. at 177. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982); Healy v. The Beer
Institute, 491 U.S. 324 (1989) (showing state laws stricken as unconstitutional); but see CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (upholding a statute under this
analysis).
36 See 969 F. Supp. at 177.
37 Id.
31 See id. (citing Pike v. Bruce Church; accord Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434
U.S. 429 (1978) (unconstitutional state highway safety regulation); Kassel, 450 U.S. 662).
39 969 F. Supp. at 177.
40 See id. at 178 (citing Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333
(1977) (unconstitutional burden placed on interstate commerce by state "consumer protection"
statute); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (unconstitutional burden by state
highway safety regulation); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (unconstitutional
burden of state health and safety regulation); Southern Pac. (unconstitutional state railroad
safety regulation)). None of these cases explicitly used the Pike test; they are merely cited for
the proposition that a state statute, no matter how legitimate the state interest, cannot unduly
burden interstate commerce.
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"speakers" of those communications have little or no motivation to comply
with the act.4'
The court also examined other New York laws that may achieve the same
goals as the act. Judge Preska found laws prohibiting obscenity and child
pornography to largely cover the communications covered by the act.42
Therefore, the class of cases reached by this act, and not covered by other
penal laws, is very limited in scope. Furthermore, New York's jurisdictional
reach of cases within this class is limited by practical considerations (e.g.,
obtaining jurisdiction and securing a defendant's presence before a New York
court).43
The burdens on interstate commerce on the other side of the test were found
by the court to be "extreme."' Judge Preska listed many communications in
the stream of normal business that might be subject to the act, including
booksellers, libraries, and on-line art galleries.4 Requiring sites such as these
to self-censor their materials in order to avoid prosecution would be "a
Hobson's choice that imposes an unreasonable restriction on interstate
commerce."' Given this evidence, the court found that "the severe burden on
interstate commerce... is not justifiable in light of the attenuated local
benefits arising from it."' 7
Topping and Gaylord both disagree about the validity of this analysis.
Gaylord finds it a "First Amendment analysis in the guise of a dormant
Commerce Clause test,'4S and Topping focuses on the economic burdens the
court highlights: "the higher transaction costs that the Act imposes on the
Internet cannot be disputed. The Act clearly externalizes these costs to
Internet users outside of New York."' 9 This disparity in interpretation goes to
the very heart of the problem with Internet regulation. The Internet, as has
been shown, is both "speech" and "transport." It would be difficult, if not
impossible, to try to regulate the Internet based exclusively on either of these
4' See 969 F. Supp. at 178 (citing 929 F. Supp at 882). This is the only place in her opinion
Judge Preska mentioned international implications of the act.
41 See 969 F. Supp. at 179.
43 See id.
" Id.
4S See id. at 179-80.
"Id. at 180 (citing Allen B. Dumont Labs., Inc. v. Carroll, 86 F. Supp. 813 (1949) (holding
that a state law which required the approval of a state censorship board before motion pictures
could be shown in the state was an unreasonable burden), affd 184 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1950)).
47 969 F. Supp. at 181.
4' Gaylord, supra note 33, at 1116.
4 Charles R. Topping, The Surf is Up, but Who Owns the Beach?-Who Should Regulate
Commerce on the Internet, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 179, 218 (1999).
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concerns. For libraries, museums, and galleries, speech is inextricably part of
their commercial activities (even if they are non-profit). Placing these
organizations on-line only complicates this problem; the mode of access is also
carrying on the commercial interests of a variety of businesses. The court's
analysis may well involve First Amendment speech issues, but the conveyance
of the speech is a commercial transport medium. Therefore, analyses of
Internet regulations will, almost by definition, include intermixed concerns.
Finally, the court turned to a long-standing Supreme Court interest in
protecting certain kinds of commerce that are most properly regulated
exclusively at the national level."0 Judge Preska found that the Internet
constitutes one such kind of commerce; "effective regulation will require
national, and more likely global, cooperation.""1 Conflicting state regulation
will have an ultimately deleterious effect on the functioning of the Internet,
and would unduly hinder its development.5 2
Judge Preska found the root of this reasoning in Wabash, St. Louis and
Pacific Railway Company:
Commerce with foreign countries and among the states,
strictly considered, consists in intercourse and traffic, includ-
ing in these terms navigation, and the transportation and
transit of persons and property, as well as the purchase, sale,
and exchange of commodities. For the regulation of com-
merce, as thus defined, there can be only one system of rules,
applicable alike to the entire country; and the authority which
can act for the whole country alone can adopt such a system.
Action upon it by separate states is not, therefore,
permissible. 3
'0 See 969 F. Supp. at 181.
51 Id.
52 See id.
" Id. (quoting Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 574-75 (1886)). The
Illinois regulation in Wabash attempted to set interstate railway rates. The Court further said in
its reasoning, "[tihat this species of regulation is one which must be, if established at all, of a
general and national character, and cannot be safely and wisely remitted to local rules and
regulations, we think is clear from what has already been said." 969 F. Supp. at 181 (quoting
Wabash, 118 U.S. at 577). Preska again citeed to most of the dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. See 969 F. Supp. at 181 (citing Southern Pac., 325 U.S. 561; Bibb, 359 U.S.
520).
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Basing her reasoning again on the "transport" analogy, Preska found that
Internet traffic, like railway and highway traffic "requires a cohesive scheme
of regulation so that users are reasonably able to determine their obligations. 54
Local regulation of Internet issues would leave an inconsistent patchwork of
rules and regulations which would be nearly impossible for users to decipher."s
In support of this argument the court noted other state's statutes-Oklahoma's
which like New York's, prohibits on-line transmission of material harmful to
minors, and Georgia's, which prohibits anonymous Internet communication.
5 6
Even when two states enact statutes with similar language, like those in
Oklahoma and New York, the definitions of the salient terms may not be
similar at all, leaving a user in even greater confusion about what is illegal
where." Preska eventually pointed out where her transportation analogy
breaks down; whereas in Southern Pacific or Kassel the train or truck can be
reconfigured in order to meet one state's regulations or even to avoid the
regulating state entirely, the Internet user has no such option.5" The court
found that:
Further development of the Internet requires that users be able
to predict the results of their Internet use with some degree of
assurance. Haphazard and uncoordinated state regulation can
only frustrate the growth of cyberspace. The need for
uniformity in this unique sphere of commerce requires that
New York's law be stricken as a violation of the Commerce
Clause. 59
Topping points out one problem with this conclusiQn: it leaves very little,
if any, space for state regulation of the Internet.6° I am not convinced that
leaving Internet regulation entirely to the federal government is undesirable,
however. Certainly, Internet regulation will require transnational cooperation.
Since states are prohibited by the United States Constitution to enter into
foreign treaties,6' they are by definition incapable of securing this international
cooperation. Judge Preska did not discuss this aspect of the Internet as
969 F. Supp. at 182.
ss See id.
16 See id. (citing Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1040.76 (1996); O.C.G.A. § 16-19-93.1 (1996)).
'7 See 969 F. Supp. at 183.
58 See id. at 182.
'9 Id. at 183.
" Topping, supra note 49, at 222.
61 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, c1. 1.
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commerce in her opinion, but I think it is a very fruitful line of inquiry which
fits nicely with her Commerce Clause analysis.
III. THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (UCC)
In order to examine contracts for the sale of goods on the Internet in the
United States, one must deal with the UCC. Slowly but surely, the UCC is
catching up to the extreme growth of on-line commerce. The July 30, 1999
Proposed Revisions to UCC article 2 specifically include a section on
electronic agreements, and definitions and concepts that have come about in
the course of Internet commerce are included in the Draft.
At a fundamental level, the very concept of "signature" has been altered.
The Draft UCC substitutes "authentication" for the current concept of
"signature"; this includes all of the old connotations of "signature," but
recognizes that on-line transactions do not always provide an opportunity for
signing an agreement.62 Wisely, the UCC also distinguishes between
"computer information" and "computer programs," recognizing that what
constitutes goods sold for computer use are not solely limited to software
(covered under "computer programs").63 A series ofdefinitions also covers the
concept of "electronic," the most important being "electronic agent,"
62 See U.C.C. § 2-102(a)(l) (Proposed Draft, July 30, 1999) [hereinafter U.C.C. Draft]. The
actual language is as follows:
(1) "Authenticate" means:
(A) to sign, or
(B) otherwise to execute or adopt a symbol or sound, or to use encryption
or another process with respect to a record, with intent of the authenticat-
ing person to:
(i) identify that person; or
(ii) adopt or accept the terms or a particular term of a record that
includes or is logically associated with, or linked to, the authenti-
cation, or to which a record containing the authentication refers.
63 See id. section 2-102(aX7) & (8). These sections define "computer information" and
"computer program" as follows:
(7) 'Computer information' means information in electronic form that is
obtained from or through the use of a computer or that is in digital or
equivalent form capable of being processed by a computer. The term
includes a copy of the information and any documentation or packaging
associated with the copy.
(8) 'Computer program' means a set of statements or instructions to be used
directly or indirectly in a computer to bring about a certain result. The term
does not include separately identifiable informational content.
"SeeMi. § 2-102(aX17).
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"electronic message," 5 and "electronic event."" Since most on-line
transactions are conducted through user interaction with a form on a web page,
it was necessary for this transaction to be covered by the UCC. "Electronic
agent" is defined as a "computer program or electronic or other automated
means used to initiate an action or respond to electronic messages or
performances without intervention by an individual at the time of the action
or response."' 7 This definition fits into the UCC sections dealing with contract
formation, which make it explicit that "interaction of electronic agents" can
form a contract."
The Draft UCC makes an interesting distinction involving the sale of
computer information with the sale of goods. The default supposition, if
computer information and goods are sold together, is that article 2 only covers
the sale of the goods."9 However, article 2 applies if "computer information
is contained in and sold as part of primary goods or sold as a replacement for
a copy contained in the primary goods."70 There are exceptions to this
exception. If the "primary goods" are computers or computer peripherals,
article 2 does not apply," nor does it apply if "giving the buyer of the primary
goods access to or use of the computer information other than for the use or
operation of the primary goods is a material purpose of the transaction." '72 The
practical upshot of this exception is that if data or information is sold along
with hardware, unless that data is required for the operation of the hardware,
the sale of the data is not covered by the UCC. The comments provide no
explanation for why this situation is treated thus.
In addition to inserting electronic contracting issues into the existing
sections of the UCC, the Draft adds subpart B to article 2, entitled "Electronic
Contracting." These sections first deal with the legal status of electronic
records, stating that, even though no hard copy may exist, the existence of an
electronic record cannot be denied legal status solely because of its "virtual"
nature. 3 The Draft also firmly states that a person who is responsible for an
6s See id. § 2-102(aX18).
"See id. § 2-102(aXl9).
See U.C.C. Draft § 2-102(aXl8).
See U.C.C. § 2-203(a). Comment 2 to this section states that subsection (a) states the
flexible principle that a contract may be made 'in any manner sufficient to show agreement.'
This includes but is not limited to offer and acceptance and the conduct of both parties or the
interaction of electronic agents that recognize the existence of a contract.
6See id. § 2-103(b).
70 id.
71 See id. § 2-103(bXl).
7 Id. § 2-103(b)(2).
71 See U.C.C. Draft § 2-210(a). This section establishes that the UCC does not require
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electronic agent is responsible for the actions of that agent, even if no person
is directly aware of the specific actions taken by the agent.74 This section
settles any potential disavowal of the actions of an electronic agent by one
party. Also covered, in general terms, is contract formation by electronic
record" (such as an e-mail) and by electronic agent76 (such as a form on a web
page). Of particular note is the exclusion of any terms included in the
agreement by a party not using an electronic agent if that party had reason to
know the agent could not respond to those terms.77
All of these general principles cross-reference the specific section of the
UCC dealing with electronic contract formation, section 2-206. This section
deals with specific issues of offer and acceptance between electronic agents,
between persons and electronic agents, and between persons where an
electronic record is generated as a part of the agreement.78
The practical implications of these provisions are less than clear in practice,
however. Many on-line agreements for services (which it bears mentioning
are not covered by the UCC) seem to implicitly follow the precepts of the
Code. Even the 1999 Proposed Draft does not recognize an e-mail account as
a "good." But what does it mean when an e-mail service explicitly tries to
disclaim an implied warranty of suitability for a particular purpose? First, I
am unable to find any case law to guide an interpretation of a company's
actions in this respect. So, it is perhaps no surprise that the guidelines of the
UCC are followed, as they at least give some concrete footing as to how
implied warranties may be disclaimed for service contracts. Even so, the
records to be kept electronically (subsection (b)), and reaffirms the general contract principle
that a person may set his or her own standards for the types of record or authentication
acceptable to him or her in a transaction (subsection (c)).
" See id. § 2-211. Responsibility is determined by the laws of agency.
71 See id. § 2-212.
76 See id. § 2-213.
" See id. § 2-213(c). The comments to subpart B provide a useful example of how all of
these sections may interact and their ramifications in the formation process.
See U.C.C. Draft § 2-206.
7 See id. § 2-102(24). The 1999 Draft requires that goods be "movable," a requirement
which an e-mail account cannot meet. However, I see the potential for a creative argument to
be made in this respect. Since most widely available e-mail accounts (such as the YahooTm mail
service) can be accessed from any computer connected to the Internet, the service can be said
to be "movable"-the user is "moving" their account from one computer to another. However,
the flaw in this argument is obvious. It seems logical that the UCC requires the goods to be
physically movable, which an e-mail service is not. A user may access their account from
different computers using various software, but the actual account does not change
locations-the user is still contacting the same physical server from whichever computer he/she
is using.
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provisions to which the service providers may be looking are not being
followed closely.
Putting aside the possibility of various services' representations creating
express warranties, most on-line services can be said to create implied
warranties of fitness for a particular purpose in their user agreements.80
However, almost all agreements attempt to disclaim these warranties in some
way in their user service agreements. Assuming that the same rules of
disclaimer contained in the UCC apply in these situations, there are a number
of reasons why such disclaimers may be ineffective. Section 2-405 deals with
the creation of an implied warranty for a specific purpose. The key prongs of
this section require the seller to know of a specific purpose for which the buyer
may use the purchased item, and that the buyer rely on the skill of the seller in
this area." As an example, take the case of a user searching for an e-mail
service. A service provider, even though it may not do more than advertise its
service, may qualify as having "knowledge" that a buyer will be using its
service for a specific purpose. By offering an e-mail service, the provider
knows (at least constructively) that the buyer will be using the service to send
and receive e-mail-the specific purpose. There may be some question as to
whether the seller possesses knowledge that the buyer is relying on the seller's
knowledge, however. As the Comments to the UCC mention, this information
is usually something that would be communicated in a face-to-face setting."2
In an electronic sales forum, this sort of knowledge is extremely difficult to
ascribe to a seller, because the buyer's "purchase" may be no more than
interaction with an electronic agent; no human on the seller's side may ever
interact with the buyer in this sort of transaction. Therefore, to what extent
may knowledge be imputed to them? Intuitively, the nature of electronic
communications should put the seller on notice that a buyer both has a certain
purpose in mind for a service and that a buyer is relying on the seller's
"o Most of my analysis deals with electronic communication services, such as e-mail or on-
line paging. Other service agreements may fall under other sections of the UCC, or other
applicable law, such as service agreements for on-line brokerage services. Section 2-403 of the
1999 Proposed Draft discusses the creation of express warranties. Subsection (a) states that any
representation that is communicated to the buyer through media such as advertising (including,
impliedly, on-line advertising) which becomes the basis for the agreement is included in the
agreement as an express warranty. Subsection (b) excludes "puffing" from this requirement, and
subsection (c) provides exceptions from (a) for some representations. Since these questions
involve quite a few fact-specific inquiries, it would not be worthwhile to discuss them here.
" See U.C.C. Draft § 2-405.
See id. § 2-405, cmt. 2. Although the comment in its discussion of knowledge of a
specific purpose refers to normal buyer/seller communication, the reasoning is equally
applicable to the seller's knowledge of a buyer's reliance on the seller's expertise.
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expertise in the field of electronic communication. Many on-line consumers
in the market today have little or no expertise in the technologies behind the
Internet; people use this technology every day without a full understanding of
the underlying processes. Therefore, perhaps it is not improper for the law to
err on the side of the electronic consumer in construing agreements, and the
presence therein of implied warranties.
If an implied warranty does exist in an electronic communication services
agreement, then the question arises of how to properly disclaim that warranty.
Section 2-406(b) deals with the steps necessary to disclaim an implied
warranty. The first rule is that the disclaimer must be conspicuously present
in a record. 3 There is no problem with an electronic agreement constituting
a "record,"'" thanks to the new definition of that term in the Proposed Draft,
but the question of what is "conspicuous" suggests a difficulty in some cases.
In written agreements, a "conspicuous" disclaimer has been ruled to be one
which is printed in all capital letters.85 But what effect does a clause typed in
capital letters have in an electronic agreement? Some services do not even
display the terms of service for the consumer's perusal before requiring their
consent. These services, do, of course, allow the buyer to read the terms
before assenting to the agreement, but, no matter how conspicuously the terms
appear in the record (however that may be constituted), does that appearance
count under the UCC when the buyer is not absolutely required to read a copy
of the agreement at the time of the transaction? With a written, tangible
agreement, it is not unreasonable to apply the principle of caveat emptor, and
hold the buyer responsible for a failure to read all the terms of an agreement
in front of him, but is the situation the same when that buyer is faced with an
electronic agreement that simply appears on his screen? Furthermore, is the
electronic printing of disclaimers in all capital letters equivalent to such
printing on a piece of paper?
The different nature of electronic agreements from other agreements
indicates that the situations are not exactly parallel. It would make more sense
See id. § 2-406(bX1).
See id. § 2-102(33).
85 See, e.g., Commercial Credit Corp. v. CYC Realty, Inc., 477 N.Y.S.2d 842 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1984). This case, in interpreting New York's enactment of UCC section 2-306, concerning
the disclaimer of warranties, holds that "conspicuous" means that a reasonable person would
notice the clause when its type is juxtaposed against the rest of the agreement. While, on the one
hand, this language is seemingly applicable to electronic agreements, it also serves to underline
my point. A reasonable person may very well not notice a disclaimer on-line when juxtaposed
against the rest of the agreement if it is displayed in capital lettersm-though boldface print, as
I recommend, may very well meet this criterion.
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for a disclaimer to qualify as conspicuous only if it is reasonably apparent to
the buyer. Hence, in order for the disclaimer in an electronic agreement to be
effective, it should be presented to the buyer before she assents to the
agreement, and it should be in boldface type. Since most service agreements
exceed one displayed page on a user's monitor, a user cannot absorb the whole
thing in one glance. Therefore, any variation in pitch of letters may not be
immediately significant. Boldface lettering would stand out in a more
noticeable manner than all capital letters.
Nevertheless, as the Practicing Law Institute (PLI) has pointed out, there
are distinct advantages to the revised article 2B approach. As an example, the
Proposed Draft preserves consumer rights under state consumer protection
statutes, while replacing the varied procedural rules under each of these state
statutes with a uniform UCC rule." Article 2B, as originally conceived by the
Drafting Committee, was supposed to dovetail with the provisions in article
2 (2A) and a separate uniform law crafted by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), the Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act (UETA).87 However, the view of the PLI is that the
NCCUSL needs to construct its projects to assure uniformity; when the
NCCUSL began all of its e-commerce projects, the stated intent was to
develop them consistently and leave the primary rules for electronic contract
formation in article 2B.u
This approach does have advantages in uniformity and clarity, but it
ignores the basic problem inherent in the UCC-it applies to trade in goods
between merchants. Since the great majority of electronic commerce occurs
between individuals, or between individuals and merchants, this problem is
quite important. To the extent the UETA applies to situations where the UCC
is inapplicable, this problem is solved, but the UETA is far from a panacea.
"See Holly K. Towle, On-Line: Selected Issues in Contracts, in SOFrTWARE ANDDATABASE
LICENsING: CURRENT TRENDS AND PROpOSED NEW LAWS 1999, 715, 718 (PLI Patents,
Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 557, 1999) [hereinafter
557 PLI/Pat 715]. Towle cites Federal Reserve Board regulations (both proposed amendments
and interim rules) which have made similar consumer protections uniform in order to enable e-
commerce. See 63 Fed. Reg. 14,528-14,558 (1998).
87 See 557 PLI/Pat at 718. The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act "applies to electronic
records and electronic signatures relating to a transaction." Unif. Electronic Transactions Act
§ 3(a) (1999) [hereinafter UETA]. The exceptions to the applicability of the UETA to a
transaction are when the following laws apply: laws which govern the creation of wills and
trusts; the UCC (except sections 1-107 and 1-206, article 2, and article 2A; the Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act; and any other laws a state enacting the UETA, may
designate). See UETA § 3(l)-(5) (1999).
'a See 557 PLI/Pat at 719.
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Its provisions seem to apply primarily to the formation of agreements, and
looks to other laws to give effect to those agreements.89 Nevertheless, the
UETA as it stands now provides a general basis for a broad range of transac-
tions which occur daily on the Internet, and the proposed article 2B adequately
addresses the potential problems with the formation of contracts between
merchants.
The history of the creation of articles 2 and 2B also reflect certain
application problems. Article 2 as it now exists reflects the end product of
centuries of jurisprudence and legislative action." The concept of "usage of
trade" as embodied in article 2 is rationally connected to this historical
background, as these many years of practices served as a background to
modem formation of agreements, even if only on the most remote levels.9
The same history cannot be said to be operative in the field of electronic
commerce. As this note has demonstrated in various circumstances, the
problems the law faces in regulating electronic transactions derive mainly
from the constant innovation in the field. Article 2B does not have the same
history to work with in attempting to formulate rules for on-line negotiations
and agreements; for instance, "usage of trade" has practically no meaning in
the context of electronic negotiations.'
This circumstance should not, though, be viewed as negative. The
NCCUSL has a great opportunity to shape desirable practices in the on-line
context. For instance, article 2B approves of what O'Rourke calls "buy now,
89 See, e.g., UETA § 5(e). The titles of the applicable substantive sections of the UETA are:
Section 5. Use of electronic records and electronic signatures; variation by
agreement,
Section 7. Legal recognition of electronic records, electronic signatures, and
electronic contracts,
Section 8. Provision of information in writing; presentation of records,
Section 9. Attribution and effect of electronic record and electronic
signature,
Section 10. Effect of change or error,
Section 12. Retention of electronic records; originals,
Section 14. Automated transaction,
Section 15. Time and place of sending and receipt;
Section 16. Transferable records.
90 See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Progressing Towards a Uniform Commercial Code for
Electronic Commerce or Racing Towards Nonuniformity?, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 635, 651
(1999).
9' See id. (citing U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1998)).
" See O'Rourke, supra note 90, at 651.
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pay later" contracts where a user may signify assent through clicking on an
icon or through shrinkwrap contracts.93
Instead of the PLI's desire for uniformity, O'Rourke advocates a legal
arena in which there are parallel rules for different circumstances (i.e., a
regime for face-to-face, hard-copy agreements and a separate regime for
electronic negotiations)." She uses the example of mass market dealings to
illustrate why her view is more persuasive. In a standard article 2 negotiation,
communication difficulties, either in personally conveying information to the
buyer or providing such information on the packaging, make it reasonable to
develop a rule whereby a seller can provide terms subsequent to payment
through an insert in the packaged good and to allow a buyer to reject those
terms once they are read.95
In opposition to this situation is an on-line deal. Communication between
parties is uncomplicated and practically instantaneous, so it is fairly simple
to make available to the buyer any post-payment terms on the Internet and
insure that the buyer cannot accept the terms without first reading them (or at
least being exposed to them)." The question this dichotomy presents is the
propriety of codifying rules which may be appropriate in one market but not
in the other, simply for the sake of uniformity. What may recommend mass
market rules in "tangible" transactions may not pertain to electronic mass
market rules. For example, should "course of trade" codify the practice (to the
extent a practice can be determined and deemed common) of placing terms of
an agreement on a website in a location which the consumer may not be
required to directly access, or should the propagated rules seek to require
conformity with another practice?' The different capacities to facilitate
communication and provide information in an on-line setting and in a
" See id. at 651-52 (citing U.C.C. § 2B-207 cmt. 3 (Proposed Draft, Dec. 1998)). O'Rourke
cites an earlier draft of the UCC than that which I am using. The July, 30, 1999 Proposed Draft
to which I refer has incorporated what was termed Article 2B into Article 2 (though a "Subpart
B" is delineated in the July 1999 draft). Comment 3, dealing with what O'Rourke terms
"layered contracts" is consistent between both drafts. See U.C.C. Draft § 2-207 cmt. 3.
"Shrinkwrap contracts" are agreements which are contained on the packaging material of goods
(most typically software), usually consisting of licensing agreements. For an excellent
examination of shrinkwrap agreements under the UCC Proposed Draft (among other topics),
including useful examples, see Diane W. Savage, The Impact of Proposed Article 2B of the
Uniform Commercial Code on Consumer Contracts for Information and Computer Software,
9 Loy. CONSUMER L. REP. 251 (1997).
See O'Rourke, supra note 90, at 652.
9 See id.
See id.
97 See id.
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traditional face-to-face setting seems to require tailoring rules to different
settings."
Also, the lack of a rigid historical context for the electronic trading rules
of proposed article 2 allows the NCCUSL to learn from problems that the
current UCC has encountered in the arena of consumer protection, specifically
that states' consumer protection statutes have resulted in a certain degree of
non-uniform implementation of the UCC's basic rules."
All of these observations recognize that the Internet is a unique forum for
contract formation, a forumh which requires as much creative thiniking on the
part of lawmakers as it does on the part of the technological innovators that
have made the Internet as it exists today possible. Maybe there should be
entirely separate rules for contract formation on-line, but this idea is somewhat
complicated by the facts that the UCC is still widely applicable to sales of
goods and that a wholesale change in these rules, even a small part of them,
may pose implementation problems--problems which will be compounded the
longer lawmakers leave unanswered the question of electronic commerce
rules.
IV. INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
Unsurprisingly, the United States is not the only nation that has experi-
enced wide disparities in the growth of technology and the growth of law to
deal with that technology. O'Rourke follows up on her discussion of article
2B flexibility by examining how the European Union handles similar
problems. To her, the "key in enabling global electronic commerce may be in
obtaining agreement onjurisdictional issues including what contractual choice
of law and choice of forum clauses will be enforceable."'0 This concept,
though admirable, can be characterized best. Such a solution would allow a
merchant to know what law will govern in a particular transaction, decreasing
the financial and physical effort necessary to explore all possible laws that
may apply to a transaction.' However, under both the UCC Draft and a
European Commission proposal for a directive to implement electronic
commerce laws, the state's (be it nation/state or federal state) law can
"See id.
"See id. at 653. O'Rourke points to the UCC Draft's willingness to recognize the
applicability of state consumer protection laws, if the state determines their primacy. See id.
n.76 (O'Rourke cites section 2B-107 in the Dec. 1998 draft, which appears to comport with
section 2-104 (most notably subsection (aX2) in the July Draft to which I have been referring).
o O'Rourke, supra note 90, at 653-54.
'o' See id. at 654.
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control.'0 2 If the state decides that a certain provision of its law is mandatory,
either through the Draft UCC or the Commission Proposal, that provision will
control.'03
O'Rourke suggests a response to this problem with a focus on international
harmonization of mandatory law. If, for instance, consumer protection laws
in various nation/states cause uncertainty on the part of on-line merchants,
national governments should seek uniform agreement on a minimum level of
consumer protection acceptable to all nations, which merchants then could
look to in order to prevent these merchants from having to meet several
various nations' requirements.' °4 O'Rourke's other suggestion is that the
United States bring the UCC Draft into the international arena, where ideas can
be exchanged and perhaps harmonized with other proposed legislation, such
as the Commission Proposal.'05
There is much to be gained from such a proposal-the Commission
Proposal, for example, explicitly discusses caching issues.'O By comparing
proposed legislation with each other, nations can perhaps craft more relevant
and more accurate regulations. Nevertheless, two problems remain with this
idea. First, what is the appropriate forum for such discussions? Certainly,
national governments can purse bilateral agreements to resolve these questions
(negotiations between the United States and the European Union, for example,
may fall into this category, also), but multilateral negotiations are the key to
a truly globally harmonized regulation regime. (For example, where is, say,
Japan left while the United States and European Union are negotiating their
regimes?) Where, then should these negotiations be held? The United Nations
'02 See id. at 654-55. The applicable provision of the UCC Draft section 2-104(a)(2) and
(a)(3). Comment 4 of the UCC Draft discusses international sales, mainly by reference to the
United Nations Covenant on the International Sale of Goods (CISG). "In the absence of a
choice of law term contracting out, see article 6, CISG applies to "contracts of sale of goods
between parties whose places of business are in different states. .. when the states are
Contracting States." U.C.C. Draft § 2-104 cmt. 4. The comment also points out various
exceptions to the applicability of the CISG. O'Rourke, when discussing the European
Commission Proposal, simply cites an article by two other publicists. See O'Rourke, supra note
90, at n.71. The applicable article in the Proposal which embodies this idea seems to be article
3, especially paragraphs I and 3. See Commission Proposal for a European Parliament and
Council Directive on Certain Legal Aspects of Electronic Commerce in the Internal Market, art.
3(1) & 3(3), 1999 O.J. (C 30) 4 [hereinafter Commission Proposal).
103 See O'Rourke, supra note 90, at 654. A good working definition of a mandatory rule is
that which cannot be explicitly contracted around, or through the "back door," such as
designating a forum in the choice of law clause that does not use a rule the parties wish to avoid.
'04 See id. at 656.
'o See id. at 656-57.
'o See Commission Proposal, supra note 102, art. 13.
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would seem a logical place, especially since UNCITRAL (the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law) has already propagated agreements
such as the CISG and the Model Law on Electronic Commerce.
This course of negotiations leads into what has developed into a common
theme-time. The round(s) of negotiations necessary to result in a workable
and effective agreement between concerned nations will undoubtedly take a
large amount of time, during which the conditions being discussed may well
change. I have no cogent suggestions as to how to remedy this particular
problem, though it is certainly necessary for nations to realize the enormity of
the end result, and how important that result will be for the course of the world
economy. The gravity of the situation should impel nations to take steps as
quickly as possible.
This statement is not to imply that the world is unaware of the problem;
there have been examples in both bilateral and multilateral spheres of the
willingness of nations to develop quickly the necessary regulatory framework.
For example, the United States and the United Kingdom recently concluded
(Jan. 30, 1999) a joint agreement concerning the use of the Internet in the
context of securities exchanges.' °7 Both countries recognize the importance
of e-commerce laws, noting that "[t]he information superhighway promises to
utterly transform commercial transactions."' 8 The general principles, as stated
in the agreement, show both a recognition of a need for uniformity, and,
inexplicably, an almost total abdication of government action in favor of
business-driven regulation, stating that "the private sector should lead in the
development of electronic commerce and in establishing business practices.""°9
Further:
Governments should ensure that business enjoys a clear,
consistent and predictable legal environment to enable it to do
so, while avoiding unnecessary regulations or restrictions on
electronic commerce. Governments should encourage the
private sector to meet public interest goals through codes of
conduct, model contracts, guidelines, and enforcement
mechanisms developed by the private sector. Government
Actions [sic], when needed, should be transparent, minimal,
107 SeeElectronic Commerce-US-UKJoint Statement, in SECURITIESLAW&THE INTERNET:
DOING BusINESs IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING MARKETPLACE 1999, 617 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac.
Course Handbook Series No. 1128, 1999) [hereinafter 1128 PLI/Corp 617].
'" Id. at 620.
1o9 Id.
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non-discriminatory, and predictable to the private sector.
Cooperation among all countries, from all regions of the
world and all levels of development, will assist in the con-
struction of a seamless environment for electronic
Commerce." 0
This statement clearly places the primary power to create electronic
commerce practice and procedure in the hands of private businesses. It seems
to be a contradiction in terms, as well as an unforgivably rosy view of
business, to think that private businesses will act to further public interest
goals. It is a basic tenet of free enterprise that businesses only implement
provisions that are in the public's interest if it is economically feasible for
them to do so or if such provisions are specifically negotiated in an agreement.
It is government's role to speak for the people in determining what restraints
this free enterprise system should face in dealing with the public. It is
nonsensical to expect that businesses will act both in their own best interests
and those of the public. Furthermore, business lacks an effective measure to
gauge what may be in the public's interest. Government is constructed to
determine such interest, through fact-finding commissions and the legislatures
themselves. Therefore, from a strictly practical viewpoint, it seems that
businesses should concentrate on making money, and government should
concentrate (at least in this context) on protecting the people.
This is not to say that I disagree with the principles embodied in the United
States-United Kingdom agreement; businesses should be the actors responsible
for developing a course of trade in electronic commerce, but the government
may ultimately have to choose to embody a certain practice in legislation for
the sake of uniformity (see UCC discussion above). Businesses are undeniably
in the best position to recognize and adjust to innovations in on-line trade and
can more efficiently react to these innovations. Government should certainly
recognize this situation and defer to established practices to the extent they are
effective and acceptable. On the other hand, to place the primary responsibil-
ity for the creation of "codes of conduct, model contracts, guidelines, and
enforcement mechanisms" is a betrayal of the public trust in government.
On its own, the United States does not seem to place such power in the
hands of business. President Clinton and Vice President Gore developed their
own, independent statement concerning global electronic commerce."' Their
"0 Id. at 621 (emphasis added).
.. See President William J. Clinton & Vice President Albert Gore, Jr., A Framework for
Global Electronic Commerce, in SECURITIES LAW & THE INTERNET: DOING BuSINESS IN A
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general principle in developing a legal regime regarding electronic commerce
is that "parties should be able to do business with each other on the Internet
under whatever terms and conditions, they agree upon.""' However, the
statement stresses the need for uniformity in developing a global legal regime
for Internet commerce, where such law can provide a baseline for market
participants to shape their agreements."' While the Clinton/Gore principle
states that market players should "define and articulate most of the rules that
will govern electronic commerce,"'. it also recognizes the need for govern-
ment to develop a common legal framework upon which parties can build in
developing their agreements." 5
This statement outlines four basic principles which the United States
government holds as guides for the formation of global electronic rules:
- parties should be free to order the contractual relationship
between themselves as they see fit;
- rules should be technology-neutral (i.e., the rules should
neither require nor assume a particular technology) and
forward looking (i.e., the rules should not hinder the use or
development of technologies in the future);
- existing rules should be modified and new rules should be
adopted only as necessary or substantially desirable to support
the use of electronic technologies; and
- the process should involve the high-tech commercial sector
as well as businesses that have not yet moved on-line."'
While these principles point to a perhaps disproportionately large role for
business, and do not indicate a role for consumer advocates to play in the
process, they do fairly state the concepts lawmakers must consider in the
development of a global regime.
The statement also recognizes the potential for uncertainty regarding
liability in a multijurisdictional context. The United States calls for a
multinational response to this problem to "clarify applicable jurisdictional
rules and to generally favor and enforce contract provisions that allow parties
RAPIDLYCHANGING MARKETPLACE 1999,509 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series
No. 1128, 1999) [hereinafter 1128 PLI/Corp 509].
112 Id. at 516.
"1 See id. at 516-17.
114 Id. at 517.
1 s See id.
116 Id.
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to select substantive rules governing liability.""17 The United States further
sets a goal for the achievement of a substantive international agreement
concerning model law within the next two years.' 8
V. CONCLUSION
The conclusion of the Clinton/Gore statement returns to the disturbingly
business-deferential attitude previously identified. The private sector, in the
administration's view, must lead the "partnership between the private and
public sectors."" 9 Soon thereafter, however, the statement seems to recognize
that government has an important role to play in the regulation of electronic
commerce: "The variety of issues being raised, the interaction among them,
and the disparate fora in which they are being addressed will necessitate a
coordinated, targeted governmental approach to avoid inefficiencies and
duplication in developing and reviewing policy."' 0 These factors are the very
reasons why government should take the lead in regulation, at least insofar as
they are more capable to address these issues. To reiterate, I do not hold that
business is inherently unfit to self-regulate on the Internet. Rather, as more
and more companies become involved, many of them traditionally based and
experienced in the physical exchange of goods, a coherent, business-driven
plan will be well-nigh impossible to create. It is then government's job to
establish baselines for the operation of electronic trade-baselines which may
indeed be formulated from the efforts of on-line businesses.
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
seems to embrace such an approach in its work regarding electronic com-
merce. In November of 1997, the OECD held a conference in Turku, Finland
to begin to seriously explore international issues involved in the projected
worldwide explosive growth in electronic commerce. Donald Johnson, the
Secretary General of the OECD, posed two questions at that conference which
exposed the basic electronic commerce concerns with which business and
government must struggle: "What regulatory barriers must be removed to
allow such commerce to develop and prosper?... what regulatory frameworks
are necessary to ensure a fair and competitive marketplace in the electronic
world of tomorrow?"'' Secretary General Johnston does state, as many others
nv 1128 PLI/Corp at 518.
.. See id. The date of the PLI statement is given as "June-July 1999," so the world should
look for this agreement in the summer of 2001.
9 Id. at 529.
12 Id.
"2 Dismantling the Barriers to Global Electronic Commerce, OECD Doc. DSTIIICCP(98)
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have, that business should take the lead in moving the electronic market
forward but recognizes the importance of the work of government in dealing
with the issues posed by an international market that requires global coopera-
tion. "Business will develop new markets, new products and new trading
relationships, but for electronic commerce to thrive, industry must seek with
governments to establish a stable framework for transactions that will inspire
confidence."'"
At the Turku conference, Ira Magaziner, the driving force behind the
Clinton administration's views on electronic commerce, propounded the view
that almost all regulation on the Internet should originate in the private sphere,
with an extremely limited role for government. He stated that government
should defer to market forces to work out problems, and where government
intervention is absolutely necessary (e.g., with regard to taxation and
intellectual property rights), its action should be specific and limited.' 2
Further, he stated that "[e]ven where collective action is needed it should be
private in most instances."'" Unsurprisingly, there was uniform acclaim for
this view from the private sector representatives present."n
Governmental representatives expressed a somewhat different (though not
incompatible) view during the second part of the conference. The President
of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari, focused on the need to have internationally
uniform intellectual property standards that go far to protect the owners of
such property, and stressed that consumer trust was the "central prerequisite"
to build strong electronic commerce, noting that international rules must be
developed to foster this trust. 6
Hirofumi Kawano, Director General of the Japanese Ministry of Interna-
tional Trade and Industry, felt that the key policy issues that must be resolved
in the field of electronic commerce were the construction of an international
framework, developing rules for commercial transactions, addressing
13/FINAL, reprinted in OECD WoRKiNG PAPERS, v. 6, no. 56 at 19 (1998) [hereinafter Turku
Report].
122 Id.
1'" See id. at 26. Mr. Magaziner was a Special Advisor to the President of the United States.
124 Id.
,2 The Turku conference was divided into two parts. One part, conducted under the auspices
of the Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD (BIAC), examined barriers to
business operation in the on-line field and business' suggestions for removing these barriers.
It was called the Business-Government Forum. The other part was an International Conference,
organized by the OECD and Finland in cooperation with the European Commission, Japan and
BIAC. See Turku Report, supra note 121, at 4.
'" See id. at 33-34.
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consumer concerns, assuring interoperability, and the resolution of institu-
tional issues.'27
The International Conference also identified regulatory uncertainty as an
issue which must be dealt with before the rapid growth of the on-line economy
made clarification impossible. In this context, the Conference identified
problems in customs and taxation, intellectual property issues, and the
updating of commercial codes, particularly in regard to jurisdictional and
liability issues.'28 The best idea concerning commercial codes was seen as the
development of some sort of international framework. "International
harmonisation of national commercial codes will require drafting a model law
for commercial practices at international [sic] level which can serve as a
common framework."' 9 Most of the discussion concerning regulatory
uncertainty centered around taxation and customs issues, however.'3"
The conclusion of the Conference's work resulted in a commitment to
develop electronic taxation guidelines and uniform consumer protection
rules.' The roles of business and government were defined as well. Since
most participants of the Conference felt that business should self-regulate, it
was seen as inappropriate for the OECD to take an extensive role in arenas in
which they have no expertise to offer. Industry groups were charged to come
forward in order to develop industry-led solutions to the problems the
Conference identified but were specifically urged to take consumer interests
into account: "For self-regulation to be credible, the broader interests of the
public must be taken into account and there must be transparent mechanisms
for auditing for compliance and enforcement."' 32 In keeping with the view of
government as a somewhat secondary player in the on-line sphere, only three
areas of government action were noted: education of citizens so they could
contribute to the "knowledge-based economy"; demonstrating new technology
through government action, such as procurement; and providing "a key source
of framework conditions for business activity."'1
33
In October of 1998, the OECD conducted a ministerial conference in
Ottawa, both to follow up on the work that had been done at Turku, and to
attempt to at least outline OECD action on electronic commerce. The nature
of electronic commerce was recognized to "require a broad, collaborative
12 See Turku Report, supra note 121, at 35.
128 See id. at 39.
129 Id.
130 See id. at 39-42.
131 See id. at 44-45.
132 Turku Report, supra note 121, at 44.
133 Id.
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approach by governments, the private sector, and international organisations
to ensure a stable and predictable environment which facilitates its growth and
maximises its social and economic potential across all economies and
societies.""t
Four themes were identified as necessary for facilitating electronic
commerce: "building trust for users and consumers"; "establishing ground
rules for the digital marketplace"; "enhancing the information infrastructure
for electronic commerce"; and "maximising the benefits."'' The description
of these themes makes it clear that, once again, businesses will be bearing the
primary responsibility for developing many of the guidelines for electronic
commerce, but government will play an important role in ensuring that
consumers feel safe on-line and trust electronic commerce transactions (at
least insofar as they trust physical transactions); competition is stressed both
as a goal of government regulation (or deregulation) as well as a means of self-
regulation by businesses. 36 As at the Turku Conference, however, the main
role the OECD played in Ottawa was the development of overarching, fairly
tangential (though important) matters. 3
No one is quite sure what to make of the Internet, or what law to make
concerning it. The current trend in United States case law is to attempt to
pigeonhole activity on the Internet into some category with which the courts
have already dealt. While analogies of this sort may, on the surface, make it
easier to solve legal problems, they do a great disservice to the use of the
Internet. Both speech and commercial activity on-line, while admittedly
sharing some similar aspects with speech in print or face-to-face commercial
transactions, have their own unique nature. Failure to recognize this has
resulted in much of the current uncertainty in national law. Some brave jurist
must create a separate area of Internet law so as to preserve the unique aspects
of the Internet, and not force it into the jurisprudence surrounding prior
technologies.
The efforts in re-drafting the UCC show a great appreciation for at least
some of the problems faced in on-line contract formation. While the Proposed
Draft goes far to facilitate on-line sale of goods between merchants, there is
4 OECD Ministerial Conference, A Borderless World: Realising the Potential of Global
Electronic Commerce, OECD Doc. SG/EC(98)14/REV6, reprinted in OECDWORKNGPAPERS,
v. 6, no. 90 at 4 (1998) [hereinafter Ottawa Report].
" Id. at 4-5.
136 See id.
137 See id. at 12-18. These pages include the Ministerial Declarations issued subsequent to
the Ottawa Conference. They consist of declarations on on-line privacy, consumer protection,
and authentication.
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a very large open area concerning sales between individuals or sales of
services. The UETA attempts to bridge this gap, but there is still an open
question as to how to deal with many issues of contract formation in these
areas. The NCCUSL, or other appropriate body, must address these issues in
order for both businesses and consumers to truly feel comfortable with on-line
transactions.
International action, to the extent it exists, largely mirrors the United
States' position that on-line businesses should be primarily responsible for
regulating themselves. While the rapidly evolving nature of the Internet
certainly recommends the ability of business to rapidly respond to innovation,
the need for uniformity in certain situations and the need to assure certain
rights of consumers requires that government action be primary in some areas
of Internet regulation.
All of this uncertainty, not only about existing law, but also how best to
craft future laws and regulations, leaves legislators and businesses alike
wondering how best to deal with the problem. Certainly, the starting point is
found in current business practice. Each national government must act to
ensure that practices are uniform to the extent possible and desirable, and that
consumer rights are protected at every stage, be they intellectual property
rights, privacy rights, or contractual rights. 38 National governments also have
a responsibility to consider the global ramifications of their actions in this
arena. "The idea of borders, between countries but also between countries and
some international or supranational bodies like the European Union, is
questioned by the globalization of economic and socio-cultural interactions,
a globalization which is fostered by network technologies."'3 9 Nations must
take into account these considerations when crafting their national response to
electronic commerce. Furthermore, nations should be responsible enough to
realize that bilateral and multilateral negotiations will absolutely be necessary
"' One law student has suggested thatjus cogens can inform determination of these rights
and help integrate national laws into a more uniform international framework. See Sean Selin,
Comment, Governing Cyberspace: The Need for an International Solution, 32 GONZ. L. REV.
365, 584-85 (1997). I am skeptical, however. I do not see how peremptory norms regarding
anything happening on-line can be said to have developed, unless by analogy to vaguely-related
"real" (as opposed to virtual) rights. Admittedly, Selin refers to speech rights in his discussion
ofjus cogens, but if one aspect of Internet regulation will be covered byjus cogens, those norms
should apply to other aspects as well. Nevertheless, the difficulty in defining international
norms in the first place, let alone those that can be classified as peremptory, does not recommend
the principle ofjus cogens to this arena.
"9 V.J.J.M. Bekkers et al., Emerging Electronic Highways, in EMERGING ELECTRONIC
HIGHWAYS: NEW CHALLENGES FOR POLITICS AND LAW 173, 177 (Victor Bekkers et al. eds.,
1996).
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to ensure that every nation's citizens (both natural and corporate) will enjoy
uniform rights and benefits from electronic commerce, no matter where they
reside.
